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Abstract 
 
This paper calculates the impact of Active Labour Market Programmes through the use of 
three new indicators measuring the application performance of the unemployed. These 
indicators can be measured repeatedly and therefore allow the usage of Panel Regression 
methods, cancelling out any unobserved individual heterogeneity. To implement the new 
approach, data on 30,000 applications has been collected. Using this data, a large positive 
effect for unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast was estimated. For 
unemployed without such a forecast, the effect is much smaller. The paper also shows that 
the new evaluation approach fulfils the requirements of a good controlling instrument: It is 
accurate, detailed, non-intrusive, inexpensive and therefore easy to keep up to date, easy to 
understand and communicate.  
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1. Introduction 
Many national labour agencies use a large proportion of their resources for Active Labour 
Market Programmes (ALMPs), with the intention to make the reintegration of unemployed 
persons quicker and longer lasting. In 2007, the average OECD member country spent 0.56 
of its GDP on ALMPs. In order to improve the quality of these expensive programs, a good 
controlling instrument is needed. This controlling instrument should estimate the ALMP 
effects in an unbiased way. It should be easy to understand and communicate and therefore 
being trusted. It should be detailed so that its findings can be used to identify which ALMP is 
successful for which group of unemployed. Ideally, the instrument would indicate why an 
ALMP is successful or unsuccessful, so existing programs can be adapted. It should be 
relatively cheap so it can be applied on a regular basis, to keep the results updated and 
relevant for the current labour market.  
   
Unfortunately, such an instrument doesn’t exist yet. In some ways this is not surprising, as 
the challenges are nontrivial: A direct comparison between participants and non-participants 
of a certain ALMP is not possible, as it is very likely that characteristics which influence the 
decision of participation (by the unemployed or case worker) also influence the outcome on 
the labour market. Comparing only very similar participants and non-participants as done 
through the intensively used matching approach has limits because it can only rely on the 
characteristics recorded in databases. Often, many important features and skills of the 
unemployed are missing in these records. 
 
This study tries another attempt at the old research question; how can one measure the 
effect of an ALMP accurately? It doesn’t do this by applying more sophisticated statistical 
tools, but instead through a different approach and different data. As part of this study, a nine 
months data collection period was carried out at an agency of the Swiss unemployment 
insurance in the city of Zurich. During this time, all applications written by the unemployed at 
this agency, their characteristics and outcome were documented. A sample of 30,000 
applications was then coded and recorded electronically. Further data on the unemployed 
and the ALMP was collected through surveys among the case workers and the persons 
responsible for the ALMP. Through this, a very rich dataset was assembled.  
 
Based on the idea of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005), this paper measures changes in the 
application process of the same person rather than comparing different individuals. It does 
this by measuring the probability of a job interview and the frequencies of applications and 
interviews per week, indicators which can be repeatedly observed. While Falk et al. applied 
an experimental design (by adding ALMP diplomas to randomly chosen applications, 
comparing the impact of the diploma on the success rate) this new approach measures the 
impact on a purely observational base, comparing applications before, during and after 
ALMPs.  
 
The method of comparing the success of applications has been frequently used in the 
discrimination literature (under the name of correspondence-testing), but is new for the 
ALMP evaluation literature. The approach has great advantages over traditional evaluation 
methods: It allows cancelling out all time-invariant characteristics of an individual by using 
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quite simple statistical tools. It permits the calculation of individual treatment effects. It is non-
intrusive and since it does not need the consent of the persons involved, doesn’t result in a 
selection bias. Because the whole spell from beginning to end can be observed, all the 
different effects proposed by theory can be identified. Further, it fulfils the controlling criteria 
mentioned above (unbiased, easy to understand and communicate and therefore trusted, 
detailed, inexpensive and easy to update). This makes it a very powerful controlling tool.  
 
Using the data collected at the trial agency, the following results were calculated through 
panel regression estimation with fixed effects: Overall, the ALMPs had a large positive effect 
on the participants. Participation resulted in more interviews per week (the number is 
increased by 0.0308, which, at the time the average ALMP is announced, is equivalent to an 
11.1 % increase), a higher probability of a job interview (plus 0.0107, which is equivalent to a 
9.4 % increase) and a higher number of applications per week (plus 0.0972 or 3.9 %). 
 
The effects are particularly large for unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast 
while they are quite small for unemployed with a forecast below twelve months. This 
difference seems to hold important information on who should be sent to participate in 
ALMPs: It is mainly the unemployed with low chances of a quick reintegration into the labour 
market who gain from the programs.  
 
The results show further that the different subtypes of ALMPs fare very differently: On 
average, basic courses, the category “other courses” (a mix of IT and vocational training) and 
basic qualifications do well. Employment programmes and personality oriented courses on 
the other hand have a negative effect. Programs with negative effects don’t have to be 
abolished altogether; but either the programs or the mix of unemployed participating have to 
be adapted in order to reap the benefits.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way: In section 2, the four effects proposed by theory 
are illustrated and a short overview on the literature is given. The advantages of the new 
approach are elaborated in further details in section 3, and the data used is described in 
section 4. Section 5 describes the three application indicators and their development over the 
duration of the unemployment spell. In section 6 the ALMP effect is measured through Panel 
Regression analysis. The main models are presented and several sensitivity tests conducted. 
Section 7 looks at the distribution of the effect, to find out under what circumstances the 
ALMP result in a positive effect. Section 9 explains why the method is a good controlling 
method despite its inability to track the application process to its ultimate goal, the job, and 
Section 10 concludes. 
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2. Theory and related literature 
The success of ALMPs has created great interest over the past two decades and as it is 
connected to the wider topic of evaluating welfare programs in general, the related literature 
is vast. A good overview over the literature, methods and challenges involved can be 
gathered from Heckman et al. 1999, Smith and Todd 2005 and a recent study by van den 
Berg et al. 2009.  
 
There are four main effects proposed by the evaluation literature: the threat effect, the lock-in 
effect, the skill enhancement effect and the signal effect. These effects occur at different 
times during the unemployment spell, as illustrated by Figure 1, and have different effects on 
the three application indicators used in this study. The first one of these three indicators is 
“interviews per week”. This is the indicator which policy makers are most interested in, 
because it captures both quality and quantity of the application process and is closely 
connected to the final outcome, a new job (for how close exactly, see section 9). It is a vector 
of the two other indicators: “interview probability” and “applications per week”. Interview 
probability captures the chances of the application resulting in a job interview. It could be 
interpreted as the qualitative side of the application process. It is to a large extent determined 
by the employer who chooses the requirements and the number of applicants to the job 
opening (through his or her use of advertising). Application frequency, measured in 
applications per week, on the other hand can be interpreted as the search intensity, or the 
quantitative side. It is directly influenced by the unemployed person his or herself (and the 
unemployment agency, which sets a minimum requirement). 
  
The first effect, the threat effect, starts right after the unemployed has been informed about 
her or his participation in an ALMP (for an overview on the threat effect, see Rosholm and 
Svarer 2008). This effect caught a lot of attention in research, especially after the paper of 
Black et al. 2003 which concluded that the threat effect is the driving forces behind the 
evaluated welfare program in Kentucky. It predicts that the search intensity rises after the 
announcement, as the unemployed is not keen on joining the ALMP. What happens to the 
interview probability is unclear and depends on how dry the pool of suitable jobs is. If suitable 
jobs are abundant, the probability should stay the same (maybe even rise because of better 
applications being written), if not, the probability falls as each further application is a worse 
job match than the one before. Because the probability of these additional applications is 
unlikely to be zero, one would expect the effect on interviews per week to be positive. 
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Figure 1: The four ALMP effects proposed by theory  
 
  
After the ALMP has started, theory predicts the occurrence of a second effect, the lock-in-
effect. This effect happens if the ALMP is demanding and doesn’t leave the unemployed 
enough time to write as many applications as they did before the ALMP started. This will 
decrease the number of applications a person writes per week. Because unemployed 
persons are probably inclined to stop writing the applications for jobs they think they have a 
low chance to get, the average application probability should increase. Overall however the 
effect results in a lower number of invitations to job interviews. A different explanation of the 
lock-in effect is that an unemployed person reduces the search efforts if the program is 
attractive and positive treatment effects are anticipated (Carling and Richardson 2004). 
Finally, the lock-in effect could result if the case worker of the unemployed person reduces 
counselling efforts while the unemployed is participating in an ALMP (Ragni 2007). All three 
explanations point to lower search intensity during the ALMP. 
 
Increasingly with the advancement of the ALMP, and especially once the ALMP has finished, 
the desired effects should set in, i.e. the skill enhancement and/or the signal effect. The two 
differ in as far the skill enhancement is an effect on the know-how of the unemployed, like 
better application techniques and improved language skills. The signal effect on the other 
hand unfolds when the unemployed is in a better position to reveal information (a signal) to a 
potential employer about her or his productivity (Carling and Richardson 2004). One would 
expect an increase of chances on the labour market through this signal, but the diploma can 
backfire if it actually signals a lack of knowledge (Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller 2005). 
  
Table 1 summarizes the different effects. It also shows the overall trends in the three 
application indicators as predicted by theory. The overall trend for the probability of a job 
interview is downward: employers get more suspicious as they interpret a long duration of 
unemployment as a signal for low employability, low productivity or low work moral (Rosholm 
and Svarer 2004). As for applications per week, one would expect this indicator to rise over 
time as unemployed become more desperate with the end of the entitlement period nearing, 
Duration 
  
 (1) Threat Effect 
 (2) Lock-in Effect 
 (3) Skill enhancement Effect 
     (1) (4) Signal Effect 
          (3) (4) 
 
 
    
                            (2) 
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opening up their search field and writing more applications. The trend for interviews per week 
is driven through the other two indicators, and given that the interview probability presumably 
falls steeply at the beginning and then flattens out, and the number of applications per week 
increases gradually at the beginning, but then gains momentum later in the unemployment 
spell, one would expect interviews per week to fall quite quickly at the beginning, flattening 
out and then increasing towards the end. 
 
 
 
 
Overall Trend 
 
Threat effect (after 
announcement) 
Lock-in Effect 
(during ALMP) 
Skill enhancement 
Effect (after ALMP) 
Signal Effect 
(after ALMP) 
Interviews per 
week 
- 
 (steep fall at beginning, 
flattening and increase 
towards the end) 
+ - + + / - 
Probability of a 
job interview 
-  
(steep fall at beginning, 
later flattening) 
- + 
+  
(dominant  
indicator) 
+ / - 
(dominant  
indicator) 
Applications 
per week 
+ 
(slow increase at 
beginning, later gaining 
momentum 
+  
(dominant indicator) 
- 
(dominant 
indicator) 
0 0 
Table 1: The influence of the four effects on the application indicators, as proposed by 
theory 
Note: “+” indicates an increase, “-“ a decrease and “0” no changes in the indicator through the effect 
 
 
It is important to note at this point that these are all effects measured on a short term basis 
(rather than long term effects on salary, job satisfaction etc.) and on the individual level. A 
possible substitution effect (another worker is displaced because the unemployed finds a job, 
so the net gain in employment is zero) can only be measured on the macro level. There are 
also effects on the non-participants (threat effect through the pure existence of ALMPs) and 
even on employed workers (higher tax burden as ALMPs have to be paid for). There are 
limits to the microeconomic analysis. In terms of learning which ALMPs work and why, and to 
develop a controlling instrument, the micro approach seems to be the way forward however 
as macroeconomic analysis can estimate the effect only on a very aggregate level.  
 
There have been several studies on Swiss ALMPs since they’ve been introduced in the late 
nineties. Lalive et al. (2000), accounting for participation selectivity using a multivariate 
duration model, estimate that during an ALMP, participants have a lower exit rate through the 
lock-in effect. Once the ALMP is finished, the authors find a strong positive effect for women, 
but none for men. Gerfin and Lechner (2002), using the matching approach, found that wage 
subsidies work well, but conclude that vocational training programmes show disappointing 
performance. A study of Lechner and Smith (2007) concludes that the current allocation of 
unemployed to ALMP by case workers is inefficient and that efficiency is as low as if a 
random rule would be used. In a recent study, Lalive et al. (2008) used both “timing-of-
events” and matching estimation. While the estimation based on “timing-of-events” showed 
that none of the Swiss ALMPs shortened unemployment duration, the matching results were 
similar to those of Gerfin and Lechner, concluding that wage subsidies show good results 
while training and employment programmes do not. In a macroeconomic study, Zweimüller et 
al. (2006) estimated that the positive effect of wage subsidies has a darker side: a very small 
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negative effect on all non-participants actually results in a negative overall effect for the 
whole economy. Employment programmes on the other hand have a negative impact on the 
participants. Through their deterring effect however, they have a small positive impact on all 
non-participants, which results in an overall positive effect. For many of the ALMPs used in 
Switzerland therefore, the calculated results are mixed at best. They seem to work well for 
certain groups, but in average fare quite poorly. This weak performance doesn’t seem due to 
an especially bad provision of ALMPs in Switzerland, but rather reflects what researchers 
have found all over the world.  
 
 
 
 
3. The new approach and its methodological advantages 
While many statistical approaches have been used over the years, they all had to come to 
terms with the fact that, with the existing data, very sophisticated methods had to be applied, 
many of those relying on strong assumptions. Heckman et al. (1999) pointed out that “the 
best solution to the evaluation problem lies in improving the quality of the data on which 
evaluations are conducted and not in the development of formal econometric methods to 
circumvent inadequate data.” The innovation of the new approach being applied in this study 
is indeed not the statistical method but new indicators, possible through a unique data set 
especially collected for this study.  
 
The idea of the new approach is based on the work of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005). 
These authors introduced a new indicator into the ALMP evaluation literature; the probability 
of a job interview. Falk et al. (2005) recruited ten unemployed persons and got them to write 
20 applications each. While the quality of the applications was held constant, a diploma of an 
IT training course attended by the applicant was attached to 10 randomly chosen 
applications of each unemployed. The outcome of the application (did the application lead to 
a job interview?) was then reported back by the unemployed to the authors. The focus of the 
paper was on the signal effect of the IT courses: how well is a course received by potential 
employers? The study produced interesting results: while on average adding the diploma had 
a negative (not significant) effect, the individual effects spread from positive to negative. 
Adding the IT-diploma was clearly disadvantageous when applying for jobs which required 
good IT skills. The fact that someone had to attend an IT course organized by the 
unemployment insurance was taken as a signal for low IT knowledge. 
 
The approach used by Falk et al. is related to the “correspondence testing” method which is 
commonly applied in discrimination research: Two fictional applications are sent out which 
differ only in the gender or nationality of the applicant, and the researcher compares the 
success of both applications. A good overview over correspondence testing is given by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004 who used the approach using African-American and white 
American-sounding names to test for discrimination. The method has been used by 
Oberholzer-Gee 2008 using applications from unemployed and employed to test for an 
unemployment stigma. In recent papers, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) measured the effect of 
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different ethnic backgrounds and Drydakis (2009) the effect of the gender of the applicant on 
the application success.  
 
While common in the discrimination literature, the approach has not been used in the ALMP 
research. However, the ALMP effect can be analysed by using the probability of a job 
interview as indicator, measuring how employers “discriminate” between ALMP participant 
and non-participants. This new indicator has a tremendous advantage over other indicators 
used so far in studies, e.g. duration, number of months unemployed in the next year and 
salary in the new job, which lies within the fact that it can be measured several times over the 
duration of unemployment instead of only once. This makes it possible to calculate an effect 
not just by comparing two persons, but by comparing the same person over time. Thus 
unobserved heterogeneity between persons which is time-invariant can be completely 
eliminated.  
 
Furthermore, the new indicator allows the calculation of individual treatment effects instead 
of average treatment effects over all participants or groups of participants. This enables the 
researcher to observe the distribution of the effects among individuals participating, and 
simplifies identifying groups of individuals who benefit from the ALMPs (Falk, Lalive and 
Zweimüller 2005). Because the new approach conducts its estimation without a control group, 
another issue can be avoided: Sianesi 2004 argues that, depending on the program, all 
unemployed persons will join an ALMP, if only the duration of the spell is long enough. If the 
reason that the person doesn’t participate in an ALMP is that she or he found a job before 
the ALMP could have been announced, this could lead to a distortion of the estimation not in 
favour of the ALMPs.  
 
The idea of Falk, Lalive and Zweimüller (2005) is used for this study again, but modified in 
two main aspects. In addition to the indicator “probability of a job interview”, two additional 
indicators are used: the number of applications per week and interviews per week. A second 
difference is that instead of the experimental design, a purely observational design is 
implemented. While such an observational approach allows less control over the application 
process (the quality of the application cannot be held constant, for example), it has several 
advantages: It is not as time consuming and allows therefore collecting data on a much 
higher number of observations. It is non-intrusive because it doesn’t change the application 
process; the data represent the “normal” behaviour outside the monitoring period. The 
consent of the unemployed isn’t necessary to collect the data as in Switzerland; it is already 
standard that some data on applications is collected by the case workers. This is an 
advantage because no special incentives to participate in the data collection have to be 
created and therefore potential distortions can be avoided. In contrast to the way 
correspondence testing is usually used, no fictional applications have to be created; this has 
the advantage that applications are as real as possible. Forging applications can be difficult 
for researchers if applications from a whole range of educational and occupational 
backgrounds have to be mimicked. And because the whole unemployment spell from 
beginning to end can be observed, all effects proposed by theory can be identified and 
measured, not just the signal effect. All those characteristics make it possible to create a 
powerful controlling instrument which fulfils all the criteria mentioned in the introduction 
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(unbiased, easy to understand and communicate and therefore trusted, detailed, inexpensive 
and easy to update).  
 
 
 
 
4. Data 
Data on the application process is systematically gathered in all Swiss unemployment 
insurance agencies, using a self-reporting sheet filled out by the unemployed person. The 
unemployed track all their applications over the course of a month and hand the sheet over 
to the case worker at the end of the month. Most of these forms are filled out by hand, and 
while they are archived for quality checks and lawsuits, the information isn’t stored 
electronically. The data has not been used for research so far.  
 
In order to make this data source accessible and by this enabling the new form of evaluation, 
the data on the application sheets has to be stored electronically. This has been done as a 
trial run in a single agency of the Swiss unemployment insurance, the Zurich-Staffelstrasse 
agency. Being a medium sized agency with both clients from city and rural areas and with a 
wide variety of occupations, this agency seemed well suited. Data on 30,000 applications 
was gathered between 1st of July 2007 and 31st of March 2008. 
 
For efficiency reason, a stratified sample of the persons registered during the observational 
period was taken: The sample contains all unemployment spells with at least one ALMP 
participation (a quarter of all unemployed registered at Zurich-Staffelstrasse) and a random 
selection of a third of the spells in which the unemployed did not attend an ALMP. This 
sample led to a database containing data of 806 unemployment spells. Applications within 
the lay-off period and applications during the last month of unemployment were dropped, as 
these periods are subject to different rules by the unemployment insurance. Including them 
would distort the analysis. Spells which consisted solely of applications of the above 
mentioned kind were dropped with them. 
 
This leaves 738 observed spells, 338 of which are treated spells (unemployed participated at 
some stage of the unemployment spell in one or several ALMPs), containing a total of 17,910 
applications. The 400 untreated spells (unemployed didn’t participate in an ALMP at any time 
of the spell) include 12,081 applications. The number of observations decreases steeply as 
the duration of the spell increases; more and more unemployed leave as they find a job. As 
shown in Figure 2, over the first few weeks of unemployment the majority of applications 
stem from unemployed who will not participate in an ALMP during their spell. As time passes 
on, an increasing amount of the data comes from persons with ALMP. The case number can 
be low when looking at the later stages of the unemployment spell (that explains some of the 
high fluctuation in Figure 3 to 5). 
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Figure 2: Number of observations recorded in the dataset, per week of the spell  
Note: The graph shows the number of applications recorded in each of the weeks of the spell. The duration is plotted until the 
104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 unemployment spells are observed, 338 of 
which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with an ALMP”). 
 
 
Two objections to the data quality could be raised, both in connection to the self-reporting 
nature of the application sheets. The first possible objection could be that not all records are 
truthful and that some unemployed record applications they have never written. While 
wrongly recorded data (on purpose or by mistake) cannot be ruled out, the amount of 
purposeful cheating should be rather small, as case workers regularly check back with 
employers if the unemployed have indeed applied to the job indicated on their self-reporting 
sheet. Even if a small amount of cheating remains, this could only distort the calculation if 
more or less cheating is going on after the ALMP has started. There is nothing pointing to 
such an effect. The second objection could be that because of the requirement to write at 
least 8 to 12 applications, many unemployed don’t bother writing all their applications down 
and instead stop once the minimum has been reached, therefore depriving the dataset of all 
their other applications. Again, this doesn’t seem to be the case, neither according to 
statements by the case workers, nor showing up in the data. The applications are more or 
less evenly distributed over the stretch of a month, especially when looking at unemployed 
with ALMP (see Annex 1). If only the first 10 or so applications would be recorded, you’d 
expect an accumulation at the beginning of the month.  
 
There is one more issue which has to be addressed in connection to the reporting sheet: 
Among other entries, the unemployed record the outcome of the application, whether they 
had an interview, a job offer or a rejection. The case workers at the trial agency reported that 
there was some confusion about the meaning of “job interview” when unemployed were 
carrying out personal applications (showing up at a company’s door step and asking for a 
job). Some unemployed recorded such a personal application as an interview, others didn’t. 
A sensitivity test in section 6 checks if the results change if applications from unemployed 
who reported almost all of their personal applications to be successful are left away. If not 
otherwise mentioned, all applications are used. 
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Apart from the self-reporting application sheets, data sources used include the electronically 
registered data of the unemployment insurance on the unemployed persons, a survey 
conducted among the case workers at Zurich Staffelstrasse (gathering additional data on the 
unemployed, e.g. a forecast regarding the unemployment duration of each person and the 
motivation to participate in the ALMP) and a survey among the employees responsible for 
the organization of ALMPs at the Office for Economy and Labour of the canton of Zurich 
(gathering diverse data on the ALMPs).  
 
 
 
 
5. Changes in the three application indicators over time 
To get an overview, the three application indicators are plotted over the duration of the 
unemployment spell. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement 
time frame in Switzerland expires. Most unemployed use their benefits up beforehand, 
usually in the 18th month. There are several deviations from this pattern for persons who 
haven’t paid into the unemployment insurance (shorter benefit period), elderly (longer period) 
and persons who participate in a work subsidy scheme (longer period). 
 
The changes in the number of interviews per week over time are shown in Figure 3. The 
similarity between the two groups is striking: For the first 10 weeks the number of interviews 
per week is exactly the same. For the remainder of the spell the development seems similar 
for both groups, with the unemployed without an ALMP showing higher volatility and a 
slightly higher level. This indicator can be considered a result of both other indicators. Its 
downward trend however, as the next two graphs show, clearly stems from the decreasing 
probability of a job interview over time, while the gently raising number of applications per 
week does little to offset this downward trend. 
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Figure 3: Frequency of interviews 
Note: The graph shows the average number of interviews per week, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used. 
 
 
Looking at the development of the second indicator, probability of a job interview (Figure 
4), one notices that both groups start off with similar chances: one in ten applications are 
successful. The similarity of that starting level, and in fact the whole development over time, 
is again surprising. One would expect quite stark differences between the two groups: Case 
workers send the persons with bad chances to an ALMP, and let the others search without 
training. 
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Figure 4: Probability of a job interview 
Note: The graph shows the average probability of a job interview, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used.  
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Chances drop for both groups quickly over time. This is what theory predicts: Employers get 
more wary as time progresses, taking the long unemployment duration as a signal for low 
employability. Unemployed themselves might broaden their search field which could entail a 
fall in the proportion of successful hits. Just as important though are the changes in the group 
composition: the successful unemployed leave early and the remaining ones have a lower 
average chance. 
 
For unemployed with ALMP there seems to be a stabilization of the interview probability after 
the first six month of unemployment, before the indicator drops again after the twelfth month 
to almost zero over the remaining duration of the entitlement frame. The development is very 
similar for the unemployed without ALMP, but because of the lower number of observations, 
the indicator is more volatile. 
 
The number of applications per week represents the quantitative side of applications 
(Figure 5). Again, both the treated and control group start off in a very similar way, with the 
member of the treated group starting just above the control group. The number of 
applications per week gently drops till the 6th month and then picks up again. Apart from a 
remarkable increase at the very end of the entitlement period, the indicator is relatively stable.  
 
According to theory, one would probably expect more of an upward trend over time, 
especially as the end of the entitlement period comes nearer. The application number seems 
to take the minimum requirement of the unemployment insurance (8 to 12 applications a 
month) as orientation. Case workers of the regional placement centre don’t seem to pressure 
the unemployed into writing more applications as time passes by. 
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Figure 5: Search intensity 
Note: The graph shows the average number of applications per week, giving equal weight to each unemployed registered in a 
certain week. The duration is plotted until the 104th week, after which the entitlement time frame expires. A total number of 738 
unemployment spells are observed, 338 of which contain an ALMP participation at some stage of the spell (“unemployed with 
an ALMP”). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used. 
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Summarizing, one can conclude that the differences between the two groups in all three 
indicators are very small. This is surprising as one would think behaviour and chances on the 
labour market as captured by the three indicators would be a main influence on the decision 
of ALMP participation. The closeness of the level and the development of the three indicators 
over the entire duration indicates that either a) the two groups are in fact very similar (i.e. that 
participation is random, at least in terms of labour market chances as captured by three 
indicators) and that the ALMPs have no influence at all, or b) that the ALMP participants 
actually do fare worse over time but that this is offset by the ALMPs.  
 
 
 
 
6. Measuring the effect through Panel Regression 
Unlike most studies on ALMP, which compare different persons with each other, the rich 
panel data at hand allows to compare applications of the same person over time. This 
eliminates a tremendous amount of unobserved heterogeneity. Because heterogeneity can 
be controlled for, widely understood statistical instruments like the regression method can be 
used, and there is no need to rely on strong assumptions. 
 
Frame of Analysis 
Whatever the estimation strategy or sample used, there are always three sets of regressions 
conducted in the following, one each for the three application indicators. For job interview 
probability the observational unit is the individual application and the dependent variable 
measures if the application resulted in a job interview (taking on the value 1 if successful, 
and 0 if unsuccessful). For the other two indicators, weekly number of interviews and 
applications, the panel is transformed so that the observational unit is one week of the 
unemployment spell. The unit shows the number of interviews or applications in that 
particular week.  
 
The effect of the ALMP is captured by the regression coefficient of a dummy variable which 
indicates if the application was sent off before (0) or after the ALMP announcement (1). The 
announcement is chosen as the focal point as it divides the spell into a period before the 
application behaviour of the unemployed was influenced by a participation, and a period 
where it is influenced, therefore capturing all possible effects of the ALMP. 
 
To calculate the coefficient of the effect dummy accurately, control variables are added to the 
model. The first set of control variables is a set of 13 duration dummies which indicate in 
which months the application was sent off (the dummies are: 1st month, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 
11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months). For the number of applications per 
week, this is simply the month in the unemployment spell that particular week is part of. For 
interview probability and the number of interviews per week, the month in which the 
applications are sent off is relevant, and not the month in which the interviews occur; the 
dataset does not contain information about the date of the job interview (the indicator 
“interviews per week” is therefore the number of interviews achieved by the applications sent 
off in a certain week). These dummies capture the influence of time in a very flexible way. It 
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is a very important set of control variables, as two of three application indicators fall steeply 
over time. Without the duration dummies, the results are heavily distorted. As applications 
after announcement are later in the spell than applications before announcement, the 
estimation wouldn’t correctly distinguish between the effect and the influence of time.  
 
An additional variable is added which indicates how many weeks before or after the ALMP 
announcement the application was sent off. If the application was sent off before the 
announcement, the value is negative. The variable thereby controls for any correlation 
between the ALMP effect and duration relative to the announcement (a cumulative effect for 
example). This model belongs to the family of event study models, which study the impact of 
an event on a variable of interest, often the stock price of a company (for a recent overview 
of this methodology, see Khotari and Warner 2006). It is common to document graphically 
the development of the indicators of interest around the “event”, thereby identifying the short 
term effect. This is done in Figure 6. Because of high fluctuations, moving averages are used. 
These moving averages are calculated separately for the weeks before and the weeks after 
the announcement. The value for the week of the announcement is calculated with both the 
data from before and after the announcement. The graph shows that there is a positive gap 
between the two values, for both probability of a job interview and interviews per week (i.e. 
the value is higher when using the moving average based on data after the event). This 
simple descriptive analysis indicates that ALMPs have a positive effect. The number of 
applications in the week of the event on the other hand is a bit smaller when calculated as a 
moving average of the weeks after the announcement, indicating a negative effect of the 
ALMP on the search intensity. 
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Figure 6: Development of the application indicators before and after the ALMP 
announcement 
Note: The graph shows the average development in the three indicators ten weeks before to ten weeks after the ALMP 
announcement (the announcement is marked with a vertical line). Because of low observational numbers and high volatility in 
the indicators, a nine week moving average is used. The moving average is applied separately to the weeks before and the 
weeks after the announcement. The value for the week of the announcement (week 0) is calculated once through a moving 
average with data before the announcement and once with data after the announcement. Data from 203 unemployed was used 
(the effect can only be calculated for ALMP participants with at least one observed application before and one application after 
the announcement). 
 
 
One more variable is added to the model, the unemployment rate in the occupation of the 
unemployed person who writes the application. This variable is measured on a monthly 
interval (e.g. for an application in September the unemployment rate of the occupation in 
September is used), and is calculated as the deviation from the median value. This variable 
is an important control variable as the state of the labour market might have both a large 
influence on the success of the application and on the performance of the ALMP. To prevent 
any bias, the control variable is added to the model. Finally, fixed effects are included, and 
thereby all time invariant differences between the unemployed are controlled for. 
 
Note that the sets of control variables overall are parsimonious, only adding variables which 
would distort the calculations of the effect. The data is rich enough to add many other 
variables to the model, which would explain the outcome (for example the characteristics of 
the application). However, by adding more variables they are effectively held constant when 
estimating the effect. If the unemployed writes different types of applications after the ALMP, 
this should not be hold constant as it is part of the effect.  
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The estimation is done through Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported. If not mentioned differently, data from all ALMP participants are 
used (there is no exclusion of outliers). All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month are included. As described in the data section, these applications 
have to be dropped as both the lay-off period and the last month are subject to different rules 
by the unemployment insurance which would potentially distort the analysis. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the average effect of the ALMPs used at the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency. 
The effect is large: An increase of 0.0308 in the number of interviews per week is the 
equivalent of 7.3 % when measured against the value of the constant, 0.4214. The constant 
can be interpreted as the number of interviews in the first month of unemployment. At the 
time the average ALMP is announced (104 days after the unemployment spell has started 
(median)) that baseline interview frequency has decreased to 0.2774 (measured as the sum 
of the constant and the coefficient for the dummy of the fourth month of unemployment). The 
relative effect is then the equivalent to a rise of 11.1 %.  
 
The interview probability is increased by 0.0107, which is the equivalent of 7.0 % measured 
in the first month of unemployment, and 9.4 % after 104 days. The effect on applications per 
week is relatively small: The unemployed write 0.0972 applications per week more after the 
announcement. That is an increase of 3.6 % in the first month, or 3.9 % measured after 104 
days. Both effects, the effect on interview probability and the one on search intensity, feed 
into the effect of the first indicator, interviews per week. However, changes in the number of 
interviews per week stem mainly from changes in the interview probability, while the search 
intensity increases just a little through the ALMP and has only a small influence on the 
increase in interviews per week.  
 
Only the coefficient for the effect on interview probability is statistically significant (on the 10 
%-level), despite the large size of the effect on interviews per week. The standard errors are 
large, indicating that there is considerable heterogeneity hidden behind the average effects. 
This heterogeneity will be further investigated below. 
 
The control sets behave as assumed: The coefficients of the duration dummies are highly 
negative and increasing over time, at least when regressing on interviews per week and 
interview probability. This shows that these indicators are falling over the duration of the spell. 
The variable “application date relative to announcement” has a negative influence. This 
indicates that there might be a small interaction between the effect and the duration i.e. that 
the effect is decreasing over time. However, the coefficient is not significant and the effect 
relatively small. The unemployment rate in the profession of the unemployed person has a 
large negative influence on both interviews per week and the interview probability, but a 
small positive effect on the search intensity. 
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Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
    Mean 0.1355 0.0493 2.7478 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.2165 1.6552 
      
Overall ALMP Effect 0.0308 0.0107+ 0.0972 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0215) (0.0061) (0.0732) 
       
Duration (omitted dummy: Month 1) 
      
    Month 2 -0.1394** -0.0344** -0.1900 
 (0.0394) (0.0094) (0.1273) 
    Month 3 -0.1596** -0.0465** -0.2278+ 
 (0.0426) (0.0110) (0.1350) 
    Month 4 -0.1440** -0.0391** -0.2239 
 (0.0502) (0.0134) (0.1530) 
    Months 5 to 6 -0.1443* -0.0420** -0.2205 
 (0.0560) (0.0152) (0.1783) 
    Months 7 to 8 -0.1674* -0.0454* -0.1811 
 (0.0700) (0.0194) (0.2214) 
    Months 9 to 10 -0.1780* -0.0516* -0.0699 
 (0.0838) (0.0242) (0.2687) 
    Months 11 to 12 -0.1691+ -0.0416 -0.1933 
 (0.0974) (0.0285) (0.3166) 
    Months 13 to 15 -0.1903 -0.0506 -0.0773 
 (0.1161) (0.0338) (0.3752) 
    Months 16 to 18 -0.2072 -0.0611 0.0045 
 (0.1356) (0.0400) (0.4618) 
    Months 19 to 21 -0.2182 -0.0606 -0.0170 
 (0.1557) (0.0465) (0.5393) 
    Months 22 to 24 -0.1699 -0.0370 -0.0751 
 (0.1808) (0.0541) (0.6130) 
    Month 25 and more -0.2820 -0.0722 0.1109 
 (0.2040) (0.0641) (0.7272) 
      
Application date relative to announcement (in weeks) -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0044 
 (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0066) 
      
Unemployment rate in occupation -0.0135** -0.0056** 0.0103 
(in percentage point deviation from the median rate) (0.0052) (0.0017) (0.0174) 
      
Fixed effects yes yes yes 
      
Constant 0.4214** 0.1532** 2.7351** 
 (0.0879) (0.0270) (0.2695) 
      
Sample 
     
All unemployed / only ALMP participants ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications or weeks 6518 17910 6518 
Number of unemployed 338 338 338 
       
Estimation 
      
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.1178 0.1454 0.1864 
F-value 4.8861 3.8608 3.2209 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
Table 2: The ALMP effect on the three indicators 
 
 
Although not all overall effects are statistically significant when measured as the average 
over all participants, there are some groups which gain heavily from the ALMP. The most 
important of these groups in terms of size and the gain through the ALMP is the group of the 
unemployed with a long term unemployment (LTU, i.e. a duration of more than 12 months) 
forecast. The forecast is an individual duration prediction recorded by the case worker at the 
start of the unemployment spell. Among ALMP participants, both groups of unemployed with 
a LTU forecast and unemployed ones are roughly of the same size. Annex 2 shows the 
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characteristics of groups split according to the duration forecast. In average, the unemployed 
with a LTU forecast are older and worked more often in the hospitality industry and public 
administration. This group has an above average proportion of unemployed with no further 
education. In terms of ALMP, they participate more often in employment programmes and 
personality oriented courses, less often in Basic courses and language courses. 
 
Because the two groups differ largely regarding the ALMP effect, the results are shown again 
in Table 3, this time with the sample split into two: One regression is conducted for the group 
with a forecast of more than 12 months (LTU); the other regression only uses data from the 
group with a forecast of less than 12 months (Non-LTU). The results show that the effect is 
very strong for unemployed with an LTU forecast while quite weak for the other group, no 
matter what indicator is examined. The group with a LTU forecast experiences an increase of 
0.0386 interviews per week. Measured against their baseline number in month one (as 
measured by the constant), this effect is equivalent to 19.4 %. After 104 days, the effect is 
equivalent to an even larger increase of 27.6 %. Interview probability increases by 0.0132 
(an increase of 23.5 % in the first month and 32.3 % after 104 days), once the ALMP has 
been announced. And the third indicator, applications per week, increases by 0.2071 (8.2 % 
in the first month, 8.7 % after 104 days). The effect of ALMP on the application indicators of 
participants with an LTU forecast is positive, very large and statistically significant. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = LTU Non-LTU LTU Non-LTU LTU Non-LTU 
    Mean 0.1033 0.1782 0.0382 0.0648 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4073 0.5479 0.1917 0.2463 1.5657 1.6716 
          
Overall ALMP Effect 0.0386+ 0.0150 0.0132+ 0.0043 0.2071* 0.0280 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0371) (0.0069) (0.0102) (0.1012) (0.1083) 
          
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application date relative to announcement yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment rate in occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          
Constant 0.1991* 0.6253** 0.0562+ 0.2425** 2.5145** 3.0000** 
 (0.0901) (0.1513) (0.0289) (0.0438) (0.3662) (0.4404) 
          
Sample 
         
All unemployed / only ALMP participants ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications or weeks 3496 2851 9451 7835 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 166 162 166 162 166 162 
          
Estimation 
         
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.2748 0.1825 0.1864 0.1178 0.2244 0.1806 
F-value 2.3576 3.1401 3.2209 4.8861 1.0121 0.7125 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
Table 3: The ALMP effect for unemployed with (without) a Long Term Unemployment 
forecast 
 
 
Unemployed with a forecast of less than 12 months on the other hand only show an increase 
of 0.0150 interviews per week (which is equivalent to 2.4 % after the first month, 3.0 % after 
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104 days), an increase in the interview probability of 0.0043 (1.8 %, 2.1 %) and an increase 
of 0.0280 applications per week (0.9 %, 1.0 %). The ALMP have also a positive effect on this 
group. Compared with the group with a LTU forecast, the effect pales though.  
 
The next table (Table 4) shows the decomposition of the overall effect into its partial effects. 
The simple dummy measuring the overall effect is substituted by three dummies which 
switch to 1 when the application is written after the announcement and before the start of the 
ALMP (threat effect), or between start and end of the ALMP (lock-in effect) or after the ALMP 
has finished (skill enhancement and signal effect). Because they both happen at the same 
time, their combined impact is measured. The coefficients compare the effect relative to the 
situation before announcement. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU 
    Mean 0.1355 0.1033 0.1782 0.0493 0.0382 0.0648 2.7478 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.4073 0.5479 0.2165 0.1917 0.2463 1.6552 1.5657 1.6716 
             
Partial Effects 
            
1. Threat Effect  0.0339 0.0159 0.0252 0.0097 0.0006 0.0071 0.1075 0.2495* -0.0085 
    (Dummy is 1 between announcement  (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0435) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0116) (0.0855) (0.1244) (0.1217) 
    and start ALMP)          
          
2. Lock-in Effect  0.0279 0.0508* -0.0020 0.0118+ 0.0203* -0.0006 0.0865 0.1842+ 0.0735 
    (Dummy is 1 between start and end ALMP) (0.0233) (0.0248) (0.0430) (0.0068) (0.0079) (0.0119) (0.0839) (0.1100) (0.1288) 
          
3. Skill enhancement and 4. signal effect  0.0269 0.0710* -0.0168 0.0126 0.0308** -0.0060 0.0678 0.1778 0.0300 
    (Dummy is 1 after the ALMP ended) (0.0302) (0.0331) (0.0542) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0154) (0.1054) (0.1406) (0.1630) 
             
Duration (13 dummies, omitted: Month 1) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Application date relative to announcement yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Unemployment rate in occupation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Constant 0.4213** 0.2038* 0.6344** 0.1531** 0.0579* 0.2456** 2.7368** 2.5078** 3.0038** 
 (0.0880) (0.0903) (0.1542) (0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0442) (0.2696) (0.3669) (0.4427) 
             
Sample 
            
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of applications 6518 3496 2851 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
             
Estimation 
            
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.2172 0.2754 0.1827 0.1454 0.1872 0.1179 0.2233 0.2245 0.1807 
F-value 2.1041 2.1213 2.7494 3.4545 3.0716 4.2914 0.6704 0.9337 0.6584 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
Table 4: The ALMP effect split into its partial effects 
 
 
All partial effects result in sizeable changes on at least one indicator, but not all of them in 
the direction proposed by theory. Regarding the threat effect, there is indeed evidence of 
changes showing up on the indicator “applications per week” once the ALMP has been 
announced. The effect only exists for the group with a LTU forecast where it is strong (+ 9.9 
% more applications per week, when measured against the constant). The group without a 
LTU forecast shows no sign of the threat effect. 
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The lock-in effect doesn’t seem to exist at all. The unemployed don’t seem to decrease their 
search intensity once the ALMP has started; on the contrary. The LTU group increases 
search efforts by 7.3 %. At the same time, the LTU group experiences a steep increase in 
the interview probability which overall results in a similarly steep increase on interviews per 
week. The group without a LTU forecast doesn’t show any changes worth mentioning. The 
lack of a lock-in effect during the ALMP is not so much surprising from a practical point of 
view as many of the ALMPs include application training. If the lock-in effect exists at all, it is 
overlaid by the skill enhancement effect which might start even before the ALMP has finished. 
 
Once the ALMP has finished, the positive effect is very large for the group with a LTU 
forecast. The leading indicator is interview probability, but there is also an increase in search 
intensity, compared with the situation before the announcement. For interviews per week and 
interview probability, the measured effect is at its strongest here, indicating the strong 
sustainability of the positive ALMP effect for this group.  
 
The non-LTU group on the other hand shows negative effects for probability and interviews 
per week after the ALMP has finished. These effects are relatively small and don’t differ 
significantly from zero. The negative effects could therefore be purely random. If a negative 
effect would remain in a larger sample, its most likely explanation would be that it stems from 
a negative signal sent out to potential employers.  
 
Sensitivity analysis 
A possible criticism questioning the validity of the results could be that the results are 
distorted because the composition of the observed group of unemployed changes over time. 
This criticism will be addressed in test 1. Further, while there are good reasons why the main 
estimation (Table 2 and 3) has been conducted with the specification chosen (those reasons 
will be stated below), it is interesting to see how robust the estimates are when the 
estimation strategy is changed. In order to test this, the main model is changed in six aspects. 
Test 2 observes how the estimates change when the panel structure is changed. The other 
tests incorporate changes regarding the duration variables (test 3), the observations used 
(dropping outliers in test 4 and personal applications with an unusual high success rate in 
test 5) and check the non-anticipation assumption (test 6). 
  
A potential issue regarding the balance of the sample (test 1) is that the panel might become 
less balanced as unemployed with low chances remain in the pool and unemployed with 
above average chances leave because they find a job. If the ALMP has a better effect on 
unemployed with low chances (as shown in Table 3), the calculated average effect might 
overestimate the true effect of the ALMP. Figure 7 shows that the chances of the remaining 
pool of unemployed don’t deteriorate as much as one might expect. For each person, the 
average of the three indicators before the announcement is calculated (pre-announcement 
value). At the moment of the announcement, the sample is complete; the average pre-
announcement values over the whole sample of ALMP participants are an interview 
probability of 0.0632, 0.1857 interviews per week and 2.9264 applications per week. Each 
week after the announcement, the sample looses members. The sample average of the pre-
announcement values falls because of the changes in the group composition; members with 
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high pre-announcement values leave the group. As a benchmark, a second line in the graph 
represents what would happen if no members would have left the group (i.e. the attrition is 
corrected): the line is horizontal as the average value would stay constant. Figure 7 shows 
that there is some deviation of the uncorrected sample mean of pre-announcement values 
from that constant, but the difference is relatively small. With other words, the estimation of 
the ALMP effect should not be biased by an imbalance in the sample. 
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Figure 7: Assessment of sample attrition (development of pre-announcement values in 
sample) 
Note: The duration is plotted until the 38th week after the announcement (the maximum for any person in the sample). A total 
number of 322 ALMP participants are observed (only ALMP participants with at least one observed application before the 
announcement can be assessed). Because of low observational numbers in certain weeks, a nine week moving average is used.  
 
 
In terms of the balance between unemployed with a LTU forecast and unemployed without 
such a forecast, a similar conclusion can be made. As time progresses, an increasing 
number of applications might stem from unemployed with a LTU forecast. Again, changes in 
the balance of the sample over time might have an impact on the results: the calculated 
effect might be larger for unemployed with a LTU forecast because there are more 
applications after the announcement. The graph in Annex 3 shows how many applications 
stem from unemployed with a LTU forecast and how many applications from unemployed 
without such a forecast, and plots the development of these numbers over the duration of the 
unemployment spell. The balance does not change as quickly as one might have anticipated 
– the sample only changes its balance slowly. Finally, as part of this first test, the main model 
is recalculated (Annex 4). Instead of one dummy switching to 1 once the ALMP has been 
not corrected for attrition in sample
corrected for attri tion in sample
Average pre-announcement value 
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announced, this model entails three dummies: One switches to 1 between 0 and 10 weeks 
after the ALMP announcement and is zero before and after this period. The second dummy 
switches to 1 between 11 and 20 weeks after the ALMP announcement and the third dummy 
in week 21 and later. The results show clearly that the large difference between the effect on 
unemployed with LTU forecast and on unemployed without such a forecast is not just due to 
the fact that unemployed with LTU forecast tend to remain longer in the sample. The results 
show that in all three assessed periods after the announcement, the LTU forecast 
unemployed fare better than the Non-LTU ones. 
   
Test 2 (Annex 5) shows what happens when all unemployed are added to the estimation, 
even the ones who haven’t participated in an ALMP. The effects of the ALMP are smaller. 
The reason for this is that the model now assumes that the effect of duration is exactly the 
same for the ALMP-participants as for the rest of the unemployed. That is not necessarily 
true: Indeed, when using separate duration dummies for the treated and control groups, the 
coefficients of the separate duration dummies are quite different (not shown in the table). 
Using different duration sets for both groups, the size of the effect coefficients increase. 
There is no gain in adding the control group members to the regression, as they don’t add 
any information on the size of the effect.  
 
The third column shows the results when dropping the fixed effects and pooling all the 
applications. The same duration dummies are used for both groups here, but a new dummy 
variable is introduced, which switches to one if the unemployed writing the application is an 
ALMP participants at some stage of his or her spell (in the following referred to as the 
treated-dummy). The coefficient of this dummy is interesting, as it shows that there is large 
negative selection into the programs: The participants have a lower performance than non-
participants in terms of interviews per week and interview probability, as shown by the 
negative coefficient of the treated-dummy. In the regression on the number of applications 
per week, the treated-dummy has a positive coefficient, indicating that ALMP participants 
write more applications than non-participants all other variables in the model kept constant.  
 
In a last step of this test, many characteristics are added to the regression, which level out 
the differences in the application indicators between participants and non-participants which 
can be explained by these characteristics. The added variables are gender (dummy), 
Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former 
industry (11 dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The separate duration 
dummies are kept in the regression. Indeed, through this the treated dummy is now almost 
zero for interview probability. It is even positive for applications per week and interviews per 
week, although the coefficient for the latter is small and not statistically significant. Together 
with the different sets of duration dummies, these variables seem to explain the differences 
in performance in the 3 application indicators rather well. 
  
What happens to the coefficient of the effect dummy? The effects get stronger when moving 
from the regression with fixed effects to pooled regressions (apart from the regression on 
applications per week). Once the set of characteristics of the unemployed are added, the 
coefficient get smaller again, in fact to about the size they have in the standard specification, 
using fixed effects and only the data from ALMP participants (again, apart from applications 
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per week). This shows that the core results are robust in terms of the estimation of the 
counterfactual development of the three application indicators, even when comparing 
applications of persons who participated in an ALMP with applications of unemployed who 
didn’t participate. 
 
The results of test 3 are shown in Annex 6. The standard model contains 13 dummies. This 
seems to be the best way to model the effect of time in a flexible way, allowing for non-linear 
influences. The results in Annex 6 show that if no time variables were used at all, the ALMP 
effects are smaller, in some regressions even negative. This downward shift of the effect 
coefficients is to be expected; as the effect dummy now partly includes the negative effect of 
time on the indicators (it does that since the applications after the announcement are by 
definition later in the spell than the applications before the announcement). The model is 
then tested by adding a more simple set of time dummies (only 5 instead of 13), and by 
adding two continuous variables (duration in weeks, duration in weeks squared). The effects 
tend to be weaker for the whole sample and even negative for the group without a LTU 
forecast. The effect for the group with LTU forecast on the other hand is quite robust. The 
test shows considerable robustness for the main finding; that ALMP should be used mainly 
for unemployed with low chances on the labour market.  
  
Test 4 (Annex 7) looks at the influence of outliers. Outliers were not excluded in the main 
estimation as there was no reason to suspect that the ALMP effect would be different for 
them. To conduct test 3, the main results are recalculated, this time without unemployed who 
show at any stage of their unemployment spell more than 15 applications a week or 5 
interviews per week. Unemployed with an overall interview probability above 0.75 are not 
covered. If the unemployment spell is longer than 2 years, it is cut off after this point. Overall, 
314 applications are dropped (1.8 % of the observations), 19 of them from unemployed with 
a LTU forecast. Accordingly, the results for the participants with a LTU forecast changes very 
little (the effect becomes a bit stronger). For the group without the LTU forecast on the other 
hand, the effect gets weaker on two of the indicators. Again, the main conclusion, that ALMP 
should be mainly used for unemployed with a LTU forecast, remains valid. 
 
Test 5 (Annex 8) recalculates the estimates, this time dropping all applications of 
unemployed who reported a success rate of 0.9 and higher for their personal applications. 
Such a high success rate is extremely unlikely and shows that the unemployed person has 
probably understood the term “interview” differently from the research team (as described in 
section 4). Through this, 130 applications of 7 unemployed are dropped. Leaving these 
applications away, the effect becomes larger for interview probability and interview per week 
when looking at the overall results and the results for group without a LTU forecast. The 
effect on interview per week almost doubles in size for unemployed without a LTU forecast. 
However, the effect remains considerably larger for unemployed with a LTU forecast. 
 
The next test, test 6 (Annex 9), checks if the participants anticipated the ALMP. If that were 
the case, the threat effect would start to exert pressure well before the course was 
announced. In order to check for that a new dummy variable is introduced into the model. 
This dummy variable switches from 0 to 1 if the application was written during the month just 
before the announcement. If the participants don’t anticipate the participation, the coefficient 
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should be zero or close to it. The results show that the coefficients of this ‘placebo’ dummy 
are insignificant (even on the 10 %-level) in all nine estimations. Some of the coefficients are 
relatively large, but this could be either due to anticipation of the ALMP or due to random 
fluctuations. By introducing a dummy for the month before the announcement, the effect 
dummy now measures the difference between applications written until a month before the 
announcement and applications written after the announcement. The performance of the 
applications until a month before the announcement is slightly weaker than the average 
application before the announcement (as indicated by the positive placebo coefficients). 
Therefore, the estimated effect of the ALMP becomes larger in the placebo estimation. The 
average effect over all participants is now significant for the indicators interviews per week as 
well. The differences between the group with a LTU forecast and the group without one 
remain large.  
 
Concluding over the six tests conducted, the results show that the coefficients are robust. 
The coefficients are particularly stable for the group of the LTU-unemployed. The coefficients 
for the non-LTU group vary and even change signs, but generally stay small. The main result, 
that the effect is much larger for the LTU group, holds throughout all changes.  
 
 
 
 
7. Who gains? 
The regressions in the last section show the average effect over all participants, the effect 
over the unemployed with a LTU forecast and the effect over unemployed without such a 
forecast. Because of its panel structure, the data set allows venturing beyond these average 
results by calculating individual treatment effects for each participant. This is useful because 
it gives further insights into which groups gain most from ALMP.  
 
Technically, the individual effects are calculated using the residuals after estimating the main 
models (Table 2). The residuals capture everything which cannot be explained through the 
average treatment effects, the duration dummies, the application date relative to 
announcement, the unemployment rate in the occupation and the fixed effect. Latter makes 
sure that any time-invariant personal characteristics are not part of the residual. The only 
systematic component in the residuals should therefore be the personal treatment effect, 
measured as the deviation from the average effect. It is captured by calculating the 
difference between the mean of all the residuals before the announcement and the mean of 
all the residuals after the announcement. In order to calculate the absolute individual 
treatment effect, the difference is simply added to the average ALMP effect. Note that the 
effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement. Altogether, the 
individual effects can be calculated for 203 unemployed. 
 
Figure 8 shows the average ALMP effect on the three application indicators. It illustrates that 
there are many winners, but also some losers among the participants.  
 26 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Individual effect on interviews per week
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Individual effect on interview probability
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Individual effect on applications per week
 
Figure 8: Distribution of the individual effects 
Note: The graph shows the distribution of the ALMP effect on the three indicators (as calculated from the estimation in Table 2). 
Data from 203 unemployed was used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application 
before the ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). Extreme outliers are not shown in the 
graphs (interview probability: four persons below 0.5 and one above 0.5; applications per week: one below -5 and two above 5; 
interviews per week: seven below -1 and three above 1). 
 
 
Regressions can now be run, explaining the individual effects through different independent 
variables to see under what circumstances the ALMP effect is increased or diminished. The 
first set of independent variables used is a set of ALMP type dummies (Table 5). In order not 
to overstretch the number of observations, each category of ALMP entails at least 16 
unemployed persons. This is admittedly a very low number still, so the results are only 
preliminary. The categories used are “basic course” (which focuses on situation analysis, 
general information about unemployment and application training), “personality oriented 
course” (assessing and developing soft skills), “basic qualification course” (alphabetization 
and very basic German), “language course” (German courses), “other courses” (IT courses 
and vocational training for different industries) and “employment programmes” (workplaces 
for the unemployed with a training component). The observational number is indicated in 
parentheses in Table 5). 
 
The different ALMP types have very different effects. The results show that the omitted 
category, basic course, has strong positive effects on all three indicators (its coefficient are 
shown by the constant). Interviews per week rises by 0.0791 (the overall ALMP effect for the 
assessed group of the 203 unemployed is 0.0281), interview probability by 0.0277 (overall 
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0.0114) and applications per week by 0.1242 (0.0940). Against the strong performance of 
this ALMP type which is also the most commonly used one, all other types fare worse, at 
least in terms of interview probability and interviews per week (the ALMP type coefficients 
show the relative performance compared to the omitted category, the basic course).  
 
Apart from the basic course, basic qualifications courses and “other course” also do well. The 
effect of the language courses is around zero as can be seen by adding the coefficients of 
the constant and the coefficient of the language course. Employment programmes and 
personality oriented courses do even worse, resulting in a negative effect on the application 
performance of its participants.1 It might surprise that the effect of these two ALMP types is 
not just zero but negative (many previous evaluations actually identify negative impacts of 
programs, see Sianesi 2008). This negative effect can stem from a decrease in motivation 
through the announcement (as part of the threat effect), a lower number of applications while 
on an ALMP (lock-in effect) and/or a bad signal sent to potential employers when adding the 
course diploma to the application (see Falk et al. 2005). The observational number is too low 
in order to measure the partial effects on a program type base. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Individual ALMP effect on Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
    Mean 0.0281 0.0114 0.0940 
    Std. Dev. 0.5520 0.1532 1.3052 
     
ALMP Type (omitted: Basic course (90 participants)) 
    
Personality oriented course (30 participants) -0.1363 -0.0569 0.0311 
 (0.1152) (0.0393) (0.2389) 
Basic qualifications course (16 participants) -0.0346 -0.0040 -0.0397 
 (0.0722) (0.0154) (0.2298) 
Language course (17 participants) -0.0815 -0.0216 -0.3994 
 (0.1179) (0.0286) (0.3735) 
Other course (18 participants) -0.0699 -0.0021 0.0442 
 (0.1584) (0.0471) (0.2865) 
Employment programme (32 participants) -0.0959 -0.0355 -0.0135 
 (0.1050) (0.0338) (0.2192) 
     
Constant 0.0791 0.0277+ 0.1242 
 (0.0702) (0.0151) (0.1795) 
Sample 
    
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of unemployed 203 203 203 
     
Estimation  
      
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.0088 0.0193 0.0076 
F-value 0.4576 0.7455 0.3126 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Data from 203 unemployed used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). 
Table 5: The effect of different types of ALMP   
 
 
Note that all coefficients but one (the effect of the basic course on interview probability) are 
insignificant, despite their large size. This means that not all participants have the same gain 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, those two ALMP types are also the longest ones. This raises the questions if the lock-in effect is responsible for 
the weak performance. This doesn’t seem to be the case, as the search intensity as measured by the number of applications 
per week is not reduced during these two types. Rather, it is the interview probability which is decreased during and after the 
ALMP. 
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from the ALMP types and there is a lot of variation in these individual effects, even when split 
up according to the ALMP type. Since the observational number is quite small, one would 
probably obtain significant differences with a larger sample. 
 
In order to find out under what circumstances the ALMP work best, characteristics can be 
added to the regression. The dataset is very rich and allows for a multitude of factors to be 
tested (both characteristics of the unemployed person and the ALMP). However, the 
influence of many of those factors is not large enough to be significant on basis of the small 
observational set.  
 
Table 6 shows how different characteristics of the unemployed person influence the ALMP 
effect. In the first block entered are three age group dummies. The results show that ALMP 
work best for the unemployed below the age of 30 (the omitted category). The coefficients 
are not statistically significant however, despite the considerable size of the coefficients. The 
next variables entered indicate the highest education the unemployed has attained. The 
results show that the higher the education of the unemployed, the better the results. The 
worst results show unemployed with no further education at all and unemployed with an 
apprenticeship, the best result unemployed with a university degree. This is surprising, 
because there is a broad choice of ALMP for unskilled persons. 
 
Foreigners and women experience a larger effect on the number of interviews per week than 
Swiss and men: Foreigners gain more than Swiss because the ALMP results in a larger 
change in the search intensity, while women have a higher increase on interview probability 
than men. If the unemployed searches for a job in the same occupation as previously held 
(overall 73 % of all ALMP participants), he or she shows a much better ALMP effect. A 
search for a job in the same occupation increases the ALMP effect on interviews per week by 
0.1484, the effect on interview probability by 0.0666 (significant on the 10 %-level) and the 
effect on applications per week by 0.1389 compared to searching a job in another occupation. 
This sheds a critical light on retraining and participants learning new skills because they 
cannot or do not want to go back to their old occupation. One could argue that this is merely 
an indication for motivation, but this effect is measured separately through the next variable. 
Motivation to participate in the ALMP has a strong positive effect, but the difference between 
motivated and unmotivated unemployed is not statistically significant. After controlling for 
motivation, the coefficient for the dummy which indicates if the person has been sanctioned 
once or several times during the unemployment spell is almost zero. 
  
As a last characteristic, the forecast of the case worker on duration is added to the 
regression. Three groups are used here, and the gains for persons with a longer duration 
forecast seem to hold even if comparing persons with 0 to 5 months forecasts with the ones 
of 7 to 11. Comparing the two extreme ends, unemployed with 0 to 5 months forecasts and 
those with a LTU forecast, the following differences are statistically significant: The ALMP 
effect on interviews per week is 0.2069 higher. This is an enormous difference, considering 
the average effect is 0.0281. 
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Dependent variable: Individual ALMP effect on: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per 
week 
    Mean 0.0281 0.0114 0.0940 
    Std. Dev. 0.5520 0.1532 1.3052 
      
Age (omitted: below 30) 
     
Age 30 - 39 -0.0144 -0.0169 0.2621 
 (0.0857) (0.0254) (0.3988) 
Age 40 to 49 -0.1660 -0.0457 0.0391 
 (0.1183) (0.0310) (0.3229) 
Age 50 and older -0.1164 -0.0544 0.0575 
 (0.0985) (0.0340) (0.3089) 
      
Education (omitted: no further education) 
     
Apprenticeship -0.0171 0.0080 -0.0030 
 (0.1483) (0.0337) (0.2184) 
Gymnasium 0.1566 0.0425 0.1491 
 (0.1096) (0.0347) (0.3116) 
Technical college 0.2393* 0.0677+ 0.4153 
 (0.1036) (0.0346) (0.3600) 
University 0.2644* 0.0459+ 0.6861 
 (0.1208) (0.0275) (0.9044) 
Education not known 0.1171 0.0237 0.1596 
 (0.1242) (0.0388) (0.4079) 
      
Of foreign origin 0.0444 -0.0118 0.2508 
 (0.1146) (0.0281) (0.2537) 
      
Woman 0.0474 0.0237 -0.2798 
 (0.0800) (0.0207) (0.2115) 
      
Former industry (12 dummies) yes yes yes 
      
Participant is searching for a job in the same 
profession than previously held 
0.1484 
(0.1147) 
0.0666+ 
(0.0385) 
0.1389 
(0.2460) 
 
   
      
Not motivated to participate in ALMP -0.0846 -0.0225 -0.2271 
 (0.0805) (0.0204) (0.4329) 
      
Sanctioned at least once during spell -0.0003 -0.0102 -0.1267 
 (0.0920) (0.0264) (0.2612) 
      
Unemployment duration forecast (omitted: Forecast 12  
months and more & forecast unknown)    
Forecast 0 to 5 months -0.2069+ -0.0590 -0.3772 
 (0.1171) (0.0367) (0.2708) 
Forecast 6 to 11 months -0.1585 -0.0384 -0.1540 
 (0.0997) (0.0298) (0.1972) 
      
Constant -0.0872 0.0042 -0.1843 
 (0.2077) (0.0583) (0.5449) 
      
Sample 
     
All unemployed vs. ALMP unemployed ALMP ALMP ALMP 
Number of unemployed 203 203 203 
      
Estimation  
     
OLS (with robust standard errors) yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.1185 0.1278 0.0873 
F-value 1.2388 1.3751 0.7564 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Data from 203 unemployed used (the effect can only be calculated for participants with at least one observed application before the 
ALMP announcement and one observed application after the announcement). 
Table 6: The influence of different characteristics on the ALMP effect 
 
 
One has to keep in mind that Table 5 shows the effect the way the ALMP types are currently 
used on the unemployed of the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency. These estimates do not just tell 
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a story about the ALMP itself, but also about its participants and how well they are adapted 
to the course itinerary. To improve performance of the ALMP types, one can adapt the ALMP 
to the existing participants, or select the participants differently for an existing ALMP, or one 
can do both. 
 
 
 
 
8. Getting a job 
A possible criticism to the new approach could be the fact that job interviews only provide a 
stepping stone on the way to find a new job and end unemployment. While this is true by 
definition, a job interview takes a job seeker a far way, as the data shows. The following 
numbers are based on the data of all unemployed who left unemployment with a job and who 
started the spell after 1st of July 2007 and ended it before 31st of March 2008. Only for this 
group the entire application history from start till end of the unemployment spell is known. 
This group only entails 76 unemployed; because of the low number of observations, the 
following results cannot be further assessed for subgroups (e.g. ALMP participants vs. non-
participants, unemployed with LTU forecast vs. Non-LTU forecast etc.). 
  
The average person who left unemployment with the opportunity to start a new job wrote 36 
applications (median value). Please note that this is a group with above average chances, 
because they found a job during the nine months of unemployment monitored. The 
probability of getting the job when writing an application is therefore 5.2 %. Within that 
process, the biggest hurdle is getting a job interview. In average, it took the unemployed 7.1 
applications for each job interview (median), resulting in a probability of 14.1 %. It then took 
them in average 2 interviews (median) to actually get a job. The chances of a job, given an 
interview, are 50.0 %. 
 
 
 
Median Mean 
Probability job interview given an application  0.1409 0.2038 
Probability job offer given a job interview  0.5000 0.5372 
Probability job offer given an application  0.0520 0.1065 
    
Number of unemployed 76 76 
Number of applications 2,053 2,053 
Notes: The table only captures unemployed who i) left unemployment with a job and ii) started unemployment 
on 1 July 2007 or later and finished their spell on 30 March 2008 or earlier. Thereby, all applications of a 
person could be recorded in the database. Because of these selection criteria, the reduced sample is not 
representative for the overall sample. 
Table 7: Probability of getting a job (reduced sample) 
 
 
The relative impact of the ALMPs on the overall probability of a job remains exactly as 
measured by the different regressions in this study, as long the ALMP doesn’t change the 
probability of a job interview. This is unlikely of course, as most acquired know-how would 
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work both when writing the application and in the job interview environment (e.g. language 
skills, self assurance, showing newly acquired job skills). It is therefore plausible that the 
ALMP effect on the probability of a job interview is are going have an effect on the probability 
of the job, given an interview, as well. 
 
It is difficult to envisage a characteristic which has a positive impact on getting to an interview, 
but then a negative one on getting the job (or the other way round). The calculated effects on 
the probability of a job interview can therefore be taken as a lower boundary of the overall 
effect on getting a job.  
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
While many previous studies applied methods which had to rely on strong assumptions in 
order to calculate accurate and unbiased estimates of the ALMP effect, the new approach 
used in this study doesn’t. This is possible through the use of new indicators and data, which 
allows measuring the outcome several times before, during, and after the ALMP. This allows 
excluding time-invariant characteristics and to solve the selection bias.  
 
The new instrument can be relatively easily applied to measure the effect of ALMPs by 
labour market institutions, as it combines several good controlling characteristics: It is a 
detailed, accurate and unbiased instrument utilizing relatively simple statistical tools. It can 
be easily understood by the persons responsible for the controlling process and 
communicated to involved partners. This makes it a trustworthy controlling instrument. It is 
inexpensive; the biggest cost involved is that the case worker has to update the application 
sheets (that is not just a cost though as it shows to the unemployed that these sheets are 
taken seriously). It can be easily updated on a regular base. This is an important 
characteristic as the ALMP might have different effects depending on the condition of the 
labour market (McVicar and Podivinsky 2008). 
 
The method was applied as a trial run in one agency in Switzerland, the Zurich-Staffelstrasse 
agency. 30,000 applications were collected, along with much information on the unemployed 
and the ALMP used. Through this, a very rich dataset could be assembled. Estimates based 
on this data show that on average, the ALMPs have a strong positive effect on the chances 
of a job interview, the weekly number of applications and the weekly number of interviews 
when applied to unemployed with a long term unemployment forecast. Applied to 
unemployed without such a forecast, the ALMP show relatively little impact. There are stark 
differences between the ALMP types as well. While most types do well, personality oriented 
courses and employment programmes have a negative impact on the application 
performance of the unemployed. These are preliminary results of course since they stem 
from the unemployed of a single agency.  
 
In order to gain more insight into the ALMPs and to start using the proposed method as a 
controlling tool, more data now needs to be collected. It is worth the effort: ALMPs are an 
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expensive tool in financial terms. If they don’t work, they are costly in human terms too, 
because both the participants and the case worker hope that these programs will shorten 
unemployment. It is time to start controlling this instrument thoroughly and on the basis of 
quantitative data, and thereby improve its quality and reputation. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Applications recorded in a typical month at the Zurich-Staffelstrasse agency 
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Note: Averages over the nine month of data collection are shown. Day 30 and day 31 were reweighed because their lower number of appearance. 
December was not taken into account. 
 
 
Annex 2: Characteristics of ALMP participants 
 
Unemployment duration forecast: 0-6 months 7-12 months 13 and more months no forecast 
         
Age 35.20 39.58 42.54 44.70 
Women 0.57 0.44 0.48 0.20 
Swiss 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.60 
 
    
Industry 
        
No answer, first sector or “private household 0.35 0.18 0.14 0.00 
Industry 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.30 
Building and Constructing 0.07 0.21 0.14 0.00 
Trade and Commerce 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.10 
Hospitality industry 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 
Transport and Communication 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 
Financial services 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.30 
Business services (incl. IT) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Public administration 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10 
Health and social services 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00 
Other services 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.00 
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Annex 2: Characteristics of ALMP participants (continued) 
 
Unemployment duration forecast: 0-6 months 7-12 months 13 and more months no forecast 
 
        
Highest attained educational 
        
no further education 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.40 
Apprenticeship  0.22 0.19 0.19 0.30 
Gymnasium 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.10 
Technical college 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.00 
University 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.20 
Education not known 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.00 
 
    
ALMP 
        
Basic course 0.63 0.54 0.31 0.30 
Personality oriented course 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.30 
Basic qualifications course 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.00 
Language course 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10 
Other course 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.00 
Employment programme 0.09 0.13 0.33 0.30 
 
    
N 54 108 166 10 
Note: Only unemployed with an ALMP at some stage of their spell are covered. Apart from age, baseline probability, ALMP treatment effect and 
the number of observations, all numbers are proportions 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3: Sensitivity test 1 - development of the number of applications after the 
announcement 
 
 
Note: The graph shows the total number of applications per week sent out by any of the 338 ALMP participants. The duration is 
plotted until the 62nd week after the ALMP announcement (this is the maximum duration for any person in the sample). 
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Annex 4: Sensitivity test 1 - model including “time since announcement”  
interaction terms 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU 
    Mean 0.1355 0.1033 0.1782 0.0493 0.0382 0.0648 2.7478 2.7034 2.7482 
    Std. Dev. 0.4752 0.4073 0.5479 0.2165 0.1917 0.2463 1.6552 1.5657 1.6716 
             
Effects split according to time since 
announcement 
           
1.  Effect between week 0 and 10 after  0.0067 0.0223** -0.0110 0.0476 0.0750 0.0622 0.0189 0.0559** -0.0224 
    announcement (Dummy is 1 from  (0.0058) (0.0069) (0.0098) (0.0726) (0.0947) (0.1094) (0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0357) 
    week 0 to week 10)          
          
2.  Effect between week 11 and 20 after  0.0005 0.0290** -0.0282* 0.0680 0.1147 0.0707 -0.0065 0.0719* -0.0907+ 
    announcement (Dummy is 1 from (0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0144) (0.1038) (0.1302) (0.1677) (0.0272) (0.0302) (0.0492) 
    week 11 to week 20)          
          
1.  Effect after week 20 (Dummy is 1  -0.0148 0.0221 -0.0526* 0.1268 0.2649 -0.0068 -0.0319 0.0737+ -0.1517* 
    from week 20 to end of spell) (0.0113) (0.0138) (0.0212) (0.1368) (0.1688) (0.2325) (0.0372) (0.0416) (0.0703) 
          
Control variables (duration;  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
    unemployment rate in occupation)          
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
           
Number of applications 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
            
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
          
R-squared 0.1457 0.1873 0.1183 0.2231 0.2240 0.1808 0.2175 0.2755 0.1834 
F-value 4.1454 3.4978 4.8996 0.5850 0.8926 0.7119 2.2975 2.3413 3.2033 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
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Annex 5: Sensitivity test 2 – on selectivity 
Annex 5a) All unemployed 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0282 0.0334 0.0397* 0.0266 0.0087 0.0113+ 0.0147** 0.0092* 0.0949 0.1100 0.0534 0.0342 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0219) (0.0215) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0722) (0.0732) (0.0565) (0.0570) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  -0.0094 0.0112   -0.0106 -0.0019    0.1984+ 0.2173* 
 
  (0.0312) (0.0310)   (0.0078) (0.0078)    (0.1032) (0.1033) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 10805 10805 10805 10805 29991 29991 29991 29991 10805 10805 10805 10805 
Number of unemployed 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2684 0.2687 0.0161 0.0421 0.1659 0.1663 0.0086 0.0246 0.2433 0.2440 0.0090 0.0195 
F-value 3.2042 1.9958 6.7740 9.4412 4.4365 3.1683 9.9932 15.1264 0.8662 0.8245 3.7452 4.2857 
 Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 5b) All unemployed with a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0374+ 0.0435* 0.0496* 0.0544* 0.0125+ 0.0151* 0.0179** 0.0183** 0.2033* 0.2106* 0.1203 0.1255 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0967) (0.1009) (0.0783) (0.0794) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  0.0448 0.0534   0.0091 0.0138    0.2593 0.2159 
 
  (0.0522) (0.0512)   (0.0134) (0.0133)    (0.1876) (0.1866) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 5497 5497 5497 5497 14938 14938 14938 14938 5497 5497 5497 5497 
Number of unemployed 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2728 0.2751 0.0121 0.0629 0.1982 0.1998 0.0085 0.0434 0.2380 0.2403 0.0128 0.0380 
F-value 1.4806 1.5549 2.5685 7.3164 2.3966 2.3529 4.9068 13.5115 0.5799 0.9089 2.7294 4.3053 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 5c) All unemployed without a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0109 0.0166 0.0373 0.0113 0.0004 0.0038 0.0152* 0.0052 0.0446 0.0531 -0.0339 -0.0609 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0097) (0.0103) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.1089) (0.1090) (0.0830) (0.0846) 
                
Duration 
               
    Specification 1: 13 dummies (same for treated and control) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
    Specification 2: 13 dummies (different for treated and control) no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
               
Panel or pooled estimation 
              
Fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy) no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Pooled, specification 1 (treatment dummy and characteristics) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Treatment dummy (ALMP at some stage of the spell) 
  0.0022 0.0293   -0.0048 0.0028    0.0991 0.1442 
 
  (0.0432) (0.0435)   (0.0108) (0.0109)    (0.1315) (0.1328) 
                
Control variables (application date relative to announcement; 
unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
               
Sample (all unemployed incl. unemployed without ALMP) 
              
Number of applications 4935 4935 4935 4935 13923 13923 13923 13923 4935 4935 4935 4935 
Number of unemployed 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
               
R-squared 0.2620 0.2619 0.0193 0.0396 0.1432 0.1437 0.0098 0.0221 0.2257 0.2268 0.0098 0.0239 
F-value 3.6299 2.1427 3.8630 4.1065 4.9027 3.2091 5.5097 6.3848 0.8542 0.7017 1.9471 2.4457 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The pooled specification 1 lacks the individual fixed effects from the standard model but contains an extra dummy describing if the unemployed participates in an ALMP at any time during his or her spell (treated 
dummy). The pooled specification 2 is like specification 1, but contains further variables: gender (dummy), Swiss/Foreigner (dummy), age (4 dummies), educational background (6 dummies), former industry (11 
dummies) and knowledge of German (5 dummies). The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Unemployment rate in 
occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used.  
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Annex 6: Sensitivity test 3 – changing the duration modelling 
Annex 6a) All ALMP participants 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0308 -0.0014 0.0117 0.0127 0.0107+ 0.0011 0.0067 0.0062 0.0972 0.0305 0.0640 0.0330 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0732) (0.0730) (0.0731) (0.0741) 
                
Duration 
               
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 6518 6518 6518 6518 17910 17910 17910 17910 6518 6518 6518 6518 
Number of unemployed 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.2172 0.2132 0.2139 0.2141 0.1454 0.1437 0.1441 0.1441 0.2232 0.2219 0.2224 0.2219 
F-value 2.3693 5.6057 3.1096 4.4200 3.8608 9.8710 5.2518 9.9042 0.7262 0.4424 0.7333 0.2746 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 6b) All ALMP participants with a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0386+ 0.0305 0.0400+ 0.0427+ 0.0132+ 0.0109+ 0.0152* 0.0160* 0.2071* 0.1936* 0.1716+ 0.1707+ 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.1012) (0.0962) (0.0993) (0.0997) 
                
Duration                
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 3496 3496 3496 3496 9451 9451 9451 9451 3496 3496 3496 3496 
Number of unemployed 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.2748 0.2688 0.2714 0.2696 0.1864 0.1830 0.1851 0.1836 0.2244 0.2220 0.2230 0.2222 
F-value 2.3576 1.5168 2.4851 1.4901 3.2209 2.9052 4.6508 3.7047 1.0121 1.5490 1.3668 1.0695 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 6c) All ALMP participants without a LTU forecast 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
                
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0150 -0.0371 -0.0150 -0.0201 0.0043 -0.0118 -0.0025 -0.0061 0.0280 -0.0516 -0.0238 -0.0050 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0371) (0.0384) (0.0378) (0.0387) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.1083) (0.1102) (0.1090) (0.1081) 
                
Duration                
Specification 1: 13 Dummies (standard) yes no no no yes no no no yes no no no 
Specification 2: No time dummies no yes no no no yes no no no yes no no 
Specification 3: 5 dummies no no yes no no no yes no no no yes no 
Specification 4: 2 variables (duration, duration squared) no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes 
                
Control variables (application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
              
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
               
Number of applications 2851 2851 2851 2851 7835 7835 7835 7835 2851 2851 2851 2851 
Number of unemployed 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
                
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
              
R-squared 0.1825 0.1717 0.1755 0.1732 0.1178 0.1116 0.1142 0.1122 0.1806 0.1780 0.1788 0.1793 
F-value 3.1401 5.7401 4.0171 4.0862 4.8861 9.2781 6.5348 8.9038 0.7125 0.3131 0.5672 0.9727 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
Specification 1 contains the following 13 duration dummies: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. Specification 3 contains the 
following 5 duration dummies: 1-2 months (omitted), 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13 and more months. Specification 4 contains two continuous variables: duration in weeks and duration in weeks 
squared. Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications except the ones from the lay-off 
period and the last month of unemployment are used. 
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Annex 7: Sensitivity test 4 – dropping outliers 
Estimation without unemployed who show at any stage of their unemployment spells more than 15 applications a week or 5 
interviews per week. Unemployed with an overall interview probability above 0.75 are not covered. If the unemployment spell is 
longer than 2 years, it is cut off after this point. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU  Non-LTU  All LTU  
Non-
LTU  All LTU  Non-LTU  
             
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0245 0.0430* 0.0003 0.0056 0.0132+ -0.0054 0.1372+ 0.2120* 0.0732 
    (Dummy is 1 after the announcement of the ALMP) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0342) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0721) (0.1018) (0.1071) 
             
Control variables (duration; application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
            
Number of applications 6428 3487 2785 17596 9432 7651 6428 3487 2785 
Number of unemployed 331 165 157 331 165 157 331 165 157 
             
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
           
R-squared 0.1866 0.2278 0.1595 0.1102 0.1429 0.0879 0.2160 0.2243 0.1867 
F-value 2.1789 2.2664 2.8293 3.3079 3.2212 4.1352 0.7453 1.0210 0.6505 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
 
 
Annex 8: Sensitivity test 5 – dropping personal applications with an unusual high 
success rate 
Unemployed who report an overall interview probability above 0.9 for their personal applications are not covered. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU Non-LTU 
            
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0360+ 0.0376+ 0.0268 0.0118+ 0.0121+ 0.0068 0.0732 0.1691 0.0224 
    (Dummy is 1 after the announcement of the ALMP) (0.0211) (0.0218) (0.0357) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0749) (0.1044) (0.1099) 
            
Control variables (duration; application date relative to 
announcement; unemployment rate in occupation) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
           
Number of applications 6263 3365 2734 17176 9060 7503 6263 3365 2734 
Number of unemployed 319 158 152 319 158 152 319 158 152 
            
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
          
R-squared 0.1834 0.2332 0.1510 0.1150 0.1500 0.0918 0.2263 0.2299 0.1807 
F-value 2.3374 2.2277 3.1856 3.9109 3.1027 4.6701 0.7137 0.9894 0.7103 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
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Annex 9: Sensitivity test 6 – testing the no anticipation assumption 
A dummy variable is added which switches to one in the period from one month before the ALMP announcement to the 
announcement. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Interviews per week Interview Probability Applications per week 
Subsample: Forecast = All LTU Non-LTU All LTU 
Non-
LTU All LTU Non-LTU 
             
Overall Effect ALMP 0.0496+ 0.0414 0.0293 0.0194* 0.0164+ 0.0123 0.1611+ 0.2349+ 0.0192 
    (Dummy is 1 after ALMP announcement) (0.0275) (0.0299) (0.0482) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0141) (0.0972) (0.1309) (0.1527) 
             
Placebo test  0.0283 0.0047 0.0196 0.0124 0.0050 0.0106 0.0962 0.0456 -0.0120 
    (Effect one month before announcement) (0.0287) (0.0299) (0.0494) (0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0990) (0.1264) (0.1511) 
             
Control variables (duration; application date 
relative to announcement; unemployment rate 
in occupation) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Sample (unemployed with ALMP) 
            
Number of applications 6518 3496 2851 17910 9451 7835 6518 3496 2851 
Number of unemployed 338 166 162 338 166 162 338 166 162 
             
Estimation (OLS with robust standard errors) 
           
R-squared 0.2173 0.2748 0.1825 0.1455 0.1864 0.1179 0.2234 0.2245 0.1806 
F-value 2.3828 2.2276 3.0741 3.8311 3.0266 4.6669 0.7905 0.9499 0.6713 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+, *, ** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The 13 duration dummies of control set 1 are: 1 (omitted), 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25 and more months. 
Unemployment rate in occupation is transformed by subtracting the median so the constant remains easy to interpret. All applications 
except the ones from the lay-off period and the last month of unemployment are used. The sample is split according to the duration 
forecast by the caseworker (LTU (long term unemployment): over 12 months). 
  
